A rare-event approach to build security analysis tools when N-k (k>1) analyses are needed (as they are in large scale power systems)

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1. Motivation for N-k analyses

Does the N-1 criterion scale to large interconnected networks?

- > it was originally designed for small to middle size systems;
- > in large interconnected networks, it is very likely that more than a single power element will be out of use at a specific instant.
- \Rightarrow More complex studies (N-2, N-3, ...) have to be performed.

2. Challenges faced

N-k (k > 1) studies are combinatorial problems.

 \Rightarrow Analyzing individually all possible N-k contingencies is intractable.

Example for a 1000 line electric network:


Number of possible contingencies (loss of lines only)
10 ⁶
10 ⁹
10 ¹²

3. Rarity assumption and formulation of the problem


While the set of possible N - k contingencies is extremely large, we assume that the dangerous contingencies are *rare*.

- \triangleright the problem of performing N-k security studies can be formulated as a problem of **identification of rare-events in combinatorial search spaces**.
- > we suggest to use importance sampling techniques to solve it.


An iterative sampling framework to identify dangerous N-k contingencies: illustration




Contingency space and contingency to identify




Profile of the severity function



First sample




Evaluation of the severity function




Selection of the best elements

An iterative sampling framework to identify dangerous N-k contingencies: illustration



Second iteration: generation of a new sample



Final sample

Technical aspects


> definition of the severity function:

It should reflect how close a contingency drives the system to its stability limit.

> metrization of the contingency space:


A metric has to be defined on the contingency space in order to represent contingencies as points in a low-dimensional space.

Technical aspects: metrization of the contingency space




Plot of the geographical map of the system (here: IEEE 14 bus system)

Technical aspects: metrization of the contingency space



Associating a contingency to each point of the space

Technical aspects: metrization of the contingency space



Associating a contingency to each point of the space

Technical aspects: metrization of the contingency space


> contingencies corresponding to points that are close to each other in the metrized space are expected to have similar effects on the security of the system.

- > the geographical representation of the network does not reflect accurately the reality of the system.
- ⇒ Representing the nodes according to their electrical distance is more relevant.

5. Results on the IEEE 118 bus test system for N-3 security analysis

Description of the problem


> IEEE 118 bus test system:



- > N-3 security analysis, only line trippings considered.
- ➤ rate of dangerous contingencies: 2,1.10⁻⁴
- ⇒ The rarity assumption is relevant.

5. Results on the IEEE 118 bus test system for N-3 security analysis

Speed at which one single contingency is identified



6. Conclusion

We have proposed a framework for efficiently performing N-k security analyses without analyzing individually all the possible contingencies.

Prospects of extension of this framework:

> identification of potentially dangerous generation patterns, topic that gains in importance with the increasing penetration of renewable energies.