

# **A quantitative analysis of the effect of flexible loads on reserve markets**

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# Outline

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Model of the system

Interaction model

Agent-based modeling

Model of the actors

Market operator

System operator

Retailer

Producer

Simulation

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# Introduction

**Electricity** is a **complex** commodity.

- ▶ **Few** possibilities of **storage**.
- ▶ Every **second**, **production** must **equal consumption**.
- ▶ Ensured in practice by the following steps:
  1. **Before real-time**, actors trade **expected quantities** and
  2. the system operator contracts **reserve** in case of mismatch.
  3. In **real-time**, the system operator ensures the **balance** by **activating the reserve**.
  4. Actors pay an **imbalance fee** proportional to their quantity of imbalance.

Historically, reserve has always been provided by production units.

## Objective of the paper

**Quantify** the impact of the introduction of **flexible loads** in the **secondary reserve market**.

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## Simulation


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# Interaction model



# Agent-based modeling

## Actor model

- ▶ Each actor is modeled individually in an **agent-based system** and solves its own **linear optimization problems**.
- ▶ These problems are based on a **forecast** of the different **prices**.

## Hypotheses

- ▶ Each retailer and producer is responsible of its own balance.
- ▶ Energy and reserve market are **pool day-ahead markets**.
- ▶ No gaming on the costs of the submitted bids.

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# Market operator

## Role

- ▶ Collects **demand** and **offer** bids.
- ▶ For **each period  $t$** , settles a **unique price**.




Figure: Clearing of single period market.

# System operator

For each period  $t$ , ensure that the **quantity of reserve** contracted is **adequate**, in this work, at least 2% of the total consumption cleared on the day-ahead energy market.

## Optimization problem

- ▶ **Data:** Flexibility offers of producers and retailers (quantities and prices).
- ▶ **Variables:** Acceptation of each offer.
- ▶ **Objective:** Minimize reserve costs.
- ▶ **Constraints:** Ensure a minimum quantity of reserve for each period .

If the **contracted** secondary reserve is **not sufficient** to restore balance, the SO may use (expensive) **non-contracted reserve**.

# Retailer

The retailer is also an **aggregator**.

Part of its consumption is **static**.

Another part is **flexible**.

For these loads, there is a **trade-off** between minimizing the **energy costs** and providing **flexibility**.

## Optimization problem

- ▶ **Objective:** Minimize energy costs and maximize expected revenues from flexibility.
- ▶ **Variables:** Consumption of the flexible loads in each period.
- ▶ **Data:** Forecast of the energy prices.
- ▶ **Constraints:** Utility and usage of the loads.

## Bids of flexible loads for the reserve market

Unlike production, **changing** the **consumption** in one period **impacts** the consumption in the **future**.

We use a reserve **service adapted** for **flexible loads**.




Figure: Example of usage of a secondary reserve bid of flexible load

# Producer

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max \sum_{t=1}^T & [\hat{\pi}_t^E P_t - (\pi^{cap} + \hat{\pi}_t^E) \max\{0, P_t^{\min} - P_t\} \\
 & - \hat{\pi}_t^{I+} I_t^+ - (\pi^{nc} - \hat{\pi}_t^{I+}) \max\{0, I_t^+ - I_t^{+\max}\} \\
 & - \hat{\pi}_t^{I-} I_t^- - (\pi^{nc} - \hat{\pi}_t^{I-}) \max\{0, I_t^- - I_t^{-\max}\} \\
 & + \epsilon U_t + \epsilon L_t - \sum_i c_{i,t} p_{i,t}] \quad (1)
 \end{aligned}$$

subject to, for  $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$ , for each production unit  $i$ :

$$p_{i,t} + u_{i,t} \leq p_{i,t}^{\max} \quad (u_{i,t} \geq 0) \quad (2)$$

$$p_{i,t}^{\min} \leq p_{i,t} - l_{i,t} \quad (l_{i,t} \geq 0) \quad (3)$$

$$(p_{i,t} + u_{i,t}) - p_{i,t-1} \leq \rho_i^u \quad (4)$$

$$p_{i,t-1} - (p_{i,t} - l_{i,t}) \leq \rho_i^d \quad (5)$$

$\forall t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$ :

$$P_t + I_t^+ - I_t^- = \sum_i p_{i,t} \quad (6)$$

$$U_t = \sum_i u_{i,t}, L_t = \sum_i l_{i,t} \quad (7)$$

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
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**General view**


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# General view of the simulated system




## Results - System operator procurement costs in €



$$\text{flexibility rate} = \frac{\text{flexible consumption}}{\text{overall consumption}}$$

## Results - Total non-contracted reserve used in MWh



At most 1% of the total consumption in the system.

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We use an **agent-based** method to simulate each actor individually using **optimization problems**.

Introducing **loads flexibility** in the reserve market may **decrease** drastically the **costs for reserve procurement**.

## Future work

- ▶ Use the method for **different market models**. For instance:
  - ▶ Include energy constrained bids in the energy market.
  - ▶ Use market-based capacity prices for the reserve procurement instead of regulated ones.
- ▶ Extend the analysis to the provision of services to solve **congestion** or over-voltage problems in **distribution networks**.